Gen. J. Franklin Bell’s Circulars to the US Army Regarding Filipino “Insurgents”

There is an extensive coverage in this web site already of the Philippine-American War from 1899 to 1902, albeit scattered resistance to American regime went on probably for at least a couple of decades more after the war was announced officially concluded.

For all intents and purposes, organized resistance to American rule was effectively over after the surrender of the Batangueño General Miguel Malvar to the American garrison in the then-municipality of Lipa in 1902.

What effectively ended this organized resistance was a concentration camp policy utilized by the United States Army against what it referred to as “insurgents¹, based upon the orders issued by General J. Franklin Bell. This possibly required the civilian population of towns in the provinces still resisting in southern Luzon to be relocated to controlled zones that would prevent them from mingling — and, thus, supporting — the Filipino freedom fighters.

For the benefit of researchers on the Philippine-American War, two telegraphic circulars² issued by Bell regarding this concentration policy³ are transcribed below:

To all Station Commanders: In order to put an end to enforced contributions, now leveled by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers of all towns now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, including those at which no garrison is stationed at present, will immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average sized garrison, to exercise efficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of armed insurgents. Those limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison and should include some ground on which livestock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by 25^th December from outlying barrios and districts with all their movable food supplies, including rice, palay, chickens, livestock, etc. to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so.

In the discretion of commanding officers, the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection.

As soon as peaceful conditions have been re-established in the territory of this brigade, these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered to them as may be found practicable.

To all Station Commanders: A general conviction, which the brigade commander shares, appears to exist in the insurrection in the territory of this brigade continues because the greater part of the people, especially the wealthy ones, pretend to desire but in reality do not want peace. That when all really want peace, we can have it promptly. Under such circumstances, it is clearly indicated that a policy should be adopted that will as soon as possible make the people want peace and want it badly.

It is an inevitable consequence of war that the innocent must generally suffer with the guilty, for when inflicting merited punishment upon a guilty class, it is unfortunately at times impossible to avoid the doing of damage to some who do not individually deserve it.

For reasons here indicated, which are well known to all, and chief of which are the delay and difficulty in ascertaining the exact truth, it will be impossible to wage war efficiently, and at the same time do abstract justice in operations unquestionably essential to putting down an insurrection which has long continued in the territory of this brigade.

Natural and commendable sympathy for suffering and loss and for those with whom friendly relations may have been maintained, should therefore take a place subordinate to the doing of whatever may be necessary to bring a people, who have as yet not felt the distressing effect of war, to a realized sense of advantages of peace.

War in the disturbed portions of the territory of this brigade, and, when manifestly necessary, in these portions supposed to be peaceful or which are under civil government, will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of G.O. 100, A.G.O. 1863, which publishes instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field. The provisions of this order will be directly adhered to, but no station commander will put anyone to death as a measure of retaliation for assassination under sections 27, 28, 34, and 148, without obtaining authority from a superior commander, nor will the death penalty be inflicted in any case without similar authority.

Commanding officers are urged and enjoined to use their discretion freely in adopting any or all measures of warfare authorized by this order which will contribute, in their judgment, toward enforcing the policy or accomplishing the purpose above announced.

It is not necessary to seek or wait for authority from these headquarters to do anything or take any action which will contribute to the end in view. It is desired that sub-district commanders accord to their subordinate officers and commanders a degree of confidence and latitude in operations similar to that herein conferred upon them. Such restraint and supervision only should be exercised as is dictated by sound discretion, and as may be essential to securing concert of action and cooperation when desirable, adherence to authorized methods, and a uniform policy and harmonious action in working for a common end. Subordinate commanders and young officers of experience should not be restrained or discouraged without excellent reason, but should be encouraged to hunt for, pursue, and vigorously operate against armed bodies of insurgents wherever they may be found.

Except when the advantage in position and numbers is overwhelming on the side of the enemy, our troops should always assume the offensive and advance on and pursue them vigorously. The best defense against these people is to assume a vigorous offensive at once. To retire in the presence of this enemy is generally hazardous and discouraging to our troops.

Nothing herein contained will be so interpreted as to warrant or arouse carelessness or a lack of well-known and proper precautions. Though troops should be aggressive, they should be military in method, and precautions against surprise and ambush should never be neglected.

In addition to maintaining active operations against armed bands of insurgents, persistent and systematic efforts will be made through the use of spies, loyal police, native scouts, intelligence officers, provost marshals, and provost courts to discover, apprehend, and punish all agents, collectors, organizers, contributors, and sympathizers who secretly aid, assist, and extend encouragement or comfort to those in arms. Many such persons will unquestionably be found among municipal officials and councils and tenientes or cabezas of barrios.

It is so probable as to amount almost to a certainty that the election of all town officials in the province of Batangas and Laguna have been dictated by Malvar or other insurgent leaders, and that they never would have been permitted to discharge their functions without molestation had they not continued to be subservient to the will of the insurgent leaders and acting as their agents, or at least have done nothing inconsistent with their interests.

The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments of either individual or town councils should be such acts publicly performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of the Americans by arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgent element. Such acts are reliable evidence, but mere words are worthless. No person should be given credit for loyalty simply because he takes the oath of allegiance or secretly conveys to Americans worthless information and idle rumors which result in nothing. Those who publicly guide our troops in operations against the enemy, who denounce and assist in arresting the secret enemies of the Government, who publicly obtain and bring reliable and valuable information to commanding officers, those in fact who publicly array themselves against the insurgents and for Americans, should be trusted and given credit for loyalty, but no others. No person should be given credit for loyalty solely on account of his having done nothing for or against us so far as known. Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every inhabitant of the territory of this brigade should either be an active friend or be classed as an enemy.

Presidentes and chiefs of police against whom sufficient evidence can be found to convict them before a court of violating their oaths by acting as agents for insurgents, or by aiding, assisting, or protecting them in any way, should be arrested and confined, and should ordinarily be tried by Military Commission. Charges should be preferred and forwarded with that in view. Other town officials guilty of similar offenses might be tried by provost courts, unless their offense be too grave for adequate punishment thereby.

Another dangerous class of enemies are wealthy sympathizers and contributors who, though holding no official positions, use all their influence in support of the insurrection, and while enjoying American protection for themselves, their families and property, secretly aid, protect, and contribute to insurgents. Chief and most important among this class of disloyal persons are native priests. It may be considered as practically certain that every native priest in the province of Batangas and Laguna is a secret enemy of the Government, and in active sympathy with insurgents. These are absolutely our most dangerous enemies — more dangerous than even the armed insurgents — because of their unequaled influence. They should be given no exemptions whatever on account of their calling. On the contrary, whenever sufficient evidence is obtainable, they should be brought to trial. Should well-founded suspicion rest against them, in the absence of competent evidence, they should be confined and held as a necessary military precaution to preclude further activity or bad influence on their part.

The same course should be pursued with all of this class, for to arrest anyone believed to be guilty of giving aid or assistance to the insurrection in any way or of giving food or comfort to the enemies of the Government, it is not necessary to wait for sufficient evidence to lead to conviction by a court, but those strongly suspected of complicity with the insurrection may be arrested and confined as a military necessity and may be held indefinitely as prisoners of war in the discretion of the station commander or until receipt of other orders from higher authority. It will frequently be found impossible to obtain any evidence against persons of influence as long as they are at liberty but once confined, evidence is easily obtainable.

The apprehension and punishment of one individual of the above-mentioned classes (men of wealth and standing and officials) is of great importance and will exercise greater influence than the punishment of a hundred ignorant hombres for whose suffering no principale cares a straw. The wealthy and influential, and town and insurgent officials are, therefore, those against whom our most energetic efforts should be directed. The common people amount to nothing. They are merely densely ignorant tools who blindly follow the lead of principales. When guilty, they must be arrested and confined, in order to put an end to further activity on their part, but whenever it is possible to reach their chief or leader through their testimony, they may be promised immunity from trial for such simple offenses as aiding and assisting, or being insurgents. They should not be released, however, unless they are willing to demonstrate their loyalty by public participation in operations against their former leaders.

The policy herein indicated need not be applied, should commanding officers be convinced it is inadvisable, in these portions of the territory of this brigade where peaceful conditions have been completely re-established, as in Marinduque, for example. Discretion should be exercised as to the degree of rigor to be employed in the enforcement in this portions of the territory of the brigade where civil government exists and where no organized insurrection or intrigue is discoverable.

Wherever the constabulary have been organized, cordial cooperation will be extended to and solicited from them. Commanding officers will promptly transmit by wire to other commanding officers any information which may possibly be of assistance to them, and are expected to seek cooperation and concert of action from each other whenever such may appear to be desirable.