Lt. George Bond's Report on the Ibaan Regiment FAIT, June 1946
The Ibaan Regiment was one of many units of the Fil-American Irregular Troops, a large guerrilla group founded by the former US Army officer Hugh Straughn, that was operating in Batangas during the Japanese Occupation. It was commanded by one Sixto Guerra. In this June 1946 document1 one Lt. George Bond filed a report after investigating the Ibaan Regiment of the FAIT. This report would be the basis for the non-recognition by the US Army of the Ibaan-based guerrilla outfit.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC
G-3 Guerrilla Affairs Branch
June 1946
REPORT ON THE “IBAAN REGIMENT”
HISTORY
THE “Ibaan Regiment” was organized in early 1943 by Captain Jorge D. Espina after he had contacted Colonel Hugh Straughn at Bo. Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. He enlisted the help of Sixto M. Guerra in organizing a unit in Ibaan, Batangas. After several months of organization, Jap spies learned of the activities of the guerrillas of Ibaan and in the pacification campaign of Jap collaborators, the leaders and their followers were prevailed upon to surrender and laid down their arms. In March 1944, Espina was captured by the Japs and since then, nothing more was learned of him. Then, Sixto M. Guerra established his own regiment at Ibaan with Iluminado Medrano as his executive officer. By the end of 1944, the unit consisted of two battalions, totalling eight companies, its total enlistment being between seven and eight hundred men.
Prior to the American landing in Batangas, the activities of the organization were limited to small scale patrolling, sabotage, and intelligence activities. Lt. Col. Guerra reported to Major C. N. Schommer of the 187th Paraglider Infantry at Tagaytay in February 1945 about his organization. When the 158 RCT arrived in Ibaan, this unit acted as guides, and assisted in mopping up operations. The unit also served with the 188th Paraglider Infantry in the same capacity for a period of a month. This unit also furnished laborers to build bypasses and repair roads. After the American units left, this unit continued its patrol work into July 1945 in order to round up any Japanese stragglers that might have infiltrated their town from Mt. Macolud. The unit was disbanded in September 1945. The unit has had 101of its members recognized by the using units.
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FINDINGS
2. Iluminado Medrano – Major, executive officer of the subject unit.
3. Rufino Montalbo – Captain, S-2 of the subject unit.
4. Alejandro Perez – Captain, Commanding Officer of the “A” Co, 1st Bn, subject unit.
5. Mercario Medrano – Captain, Surgeonof the subject unit.
6. Pedro Reyes – 1st Lt Surgeon of the subject unit.
7. Leandro Macatangay – 1st Lt of the subject unit.
8. Anastacio P. Chavez – S/Sgt in the subject unit.
9. Rafael Rivera – Sgt, Co. “C,” 1st Bn of the subject unit.
10. Vicente Perez – 1st Sgt, “A” Co., 2nd Bn of the subject unit.
11. Crisanto Macatangay – 1st Lt, “A” Co. 2nd Bn of subject unit.
12. Luis Ilagan – 1st Lt of subject unit.
13. Gerardo Reyes – 1st Lt of the subject unit.
14. Daniel Torralba – 1st Lt in subject unit.
15. Manases G. Reyes – Capt of the subject unit.
16. Miguel Mercado – Mayor of the town of Ibaan, Batangas.
17. David Reyes – Civilian.
18. Quintin Gellidon – Guerrilla leader.
19. Eligio P. Yabyabin – Major, Bn Commander of the subject unit.
Lack of control of the subject unit also appeared when it was learned that thirty of its members had joined the “Blue Eagle.”
It was stated that, before the Americans landed, only 350 members of this organization were active, the rest were held in reserve. It was also stated that those who were active, were so by rotation; that is, for one week, they trained, the next week, they went on patrol, and in the interim, they visited
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their families whenever they could. It was stated by a civilian that many civilians, and those who claim to be guerrillas, lived in the Camp because of necessity rather than because of the organization. It was stated that in addition to their duties as Guerrillas, those men on active status were able to support their families. Prior to the American landing, no guerrillas in this unit were killed or wounded in encounters with the Japanese, although those killed were, numbering 30, taken from their “homes.”
The medical officers of the unit lived in their homes, maintained their private practice, and rendered medical assistance to civilians and guerrillas alike, the same appeared to be true of the nurses corps that was established after the Americans landed in Batangas.
When the Americans landed, the unit took over the town of Ibaan, Batangas which the Japanese had left unmolested, and when the 158 RCT arrived, they acted as guides in the mopping up operations. The 158 RCT left six days later and their place was taken over by the 188th Paraglider Infantry. The 188th used this unit as guides and on their patrols; they were also used in the construction of by passes and the reconstruction of roads. It was stated by the unit that approximately 450-500 of their men served actively with the 188th, and there are certifications to the effect that the unit did in some capacity. But it was stated that the unit served by rotation. Not being able to determine the numberf men that actually served with the American unit, because of the claimed rotation system, plus the incoherent stories told by those interviewed, it is believed that the using forces recognized the number that actually rendered service to them.
Under separate cover, the regimental S-1 submitted a company roster, from which had been shifted names from the whole regiment, for recognition. This was done without the knowledge of the commanding officer of the subject unit. The commanding officer of the unit in question states that the reason they submitted this roster was to hasten recognition. Upon scutiny of this roster, it was found that all the officers had been previously recognized, but in lower grades, so it appears that they were attempting to gain their original ranks through the submission of a new roster. From this, it appears that the commanding officer of the subject unit does not have good control over his unit. Documentary evidence furnished by this unit was of little value. (See complaint letter filed on “Ibaan Regiment.”)
POLITICAL ASPECT
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Contact Team #1.