Lt. Bruce Bromley’s Unfavorable Report on the Luansing Unit
The Luansing Unit Fil-American Batangas Guerrillas were commanded by one Galicano Luansing and known loosely as the “Luansing’s Unit.” This guerrilla outfit was at one time or the other during the Japanese occupation affiliated with the Fil-American Irregular Troops and also the President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas. By the time the Allied forces return to the Philippines, it was operating independently. This unit assisted the United States Army in campaigns against the Japanese forces from Balayan, Batangas Town, Lipa, Rosario and San Juan. In this document1, one Lt. Bruce Bromley, acting on an earlier investigation conducted by one Captain Fernando, conducted another investigation and then filed this unfavorable report on the Luansing Guerrilla Unit.
REPORT ON THE LUANSING’S UNIT, FIL-AMERICAN BATANGAS GUERRILLAS
1. On 9 February 1947, Capt C. G. Fernando and 1st Lt L. J. Sonders proceeded to Rosario, Batangas and investigated the Luansing Unit. The following report is submitted by 2nd Lt Bruce Bromley Jr.
2. ALLEGED HISTORY: (See attached file unit)
3. Findings:
Col Q Gellidon ... CO, Grlas attached to 11th Ab
Col V Umali ... CO, PQOG
Maj V Luansing ... CO, subject unit
J. Recto ... Mayor, Rosario, Batangas
E. Mayo ... Mayor, Lipa, Batangas
Maj V. Coates ... this headquarters
Lt L. J. Sonders ... this headquarters
[p. 2]
During the month of March 1945, I spent much time assisting our Bn S-4 in getting supplies to the troops. This duty put me in contact with all of the 2nd Bn regularly and I do not remember ever seeing more than one company of Guerrillas all told. About 40 or 50 of these were strung out along the road to protect our kitchen crews who brought up a hot meal each day and there was approximately a platoon of 30 or 40 with each of our 3 rifle companies. We had 15 attached to our Bn S-2 section for patrolling purposes, 3 or 4 of which were killed one day while on patrol. We always kept our guerrilla forces to minimum because of the chow situation. It took 3 or 4 times as many rations for the guerrillas as it did for the GI’s. Therefore, I am sure that our guerrilla strength, on the Batangas operation, was less than 150 at all times.” Specifically, the undersigned has observed the following oddities with respect to the writ: the frequent use of capitals is not commensurate with grammatical practices in the United States, and Col Day, before the war, was a professor at a Californian University; the hand-writing, itself, is sloppy, elementary, and rather illegible; dates appearing on the letter are not in military form, and Boysie Day was a Lt Col; “Guerilla” is misspelled, “active-patrolling” is hyphenated – “Headquarters Second Battalion,” however the signature reads as follows:
Major 158th Inf
Commanding”
Day was a Lt Col, as previously stated, and was not in command of the 158th Infantry.
In the second attachment paper to Major Schommer, nothing appears radically incorrect except that the writ attaches the subject unit on 26 March 1945 to the 188th P G Inf while the former attachment paper is dated 27 March 1945. Capt R.C. Wilson, formerly of Hqs. GHQ, and presently of this headquarters, stated that such short attachments were not in general practice between American units of regimental size. The two regiments operated in the same area but not close enough to permit any such rapid change. Usually, guerrilla units were tested for a period of one week to determine if they were of any worth. If they proved to be successful, they were then officially attached and received such papers as those in question.
The third paper is [an] identification for Luansing, signed by Maj Schloth. It is not often that one makes an error in signing one’s own name. It is possible, of course, but not in common practice. Apparently, Maj Schloth made this uncommon mistake.
[p. 3]
It is also possible that some other person had signed for Maj Schloth, whose initials were BGR. It has not been determined whose initials these might be.
c. This fraudulent evidence is the basis for disqualification of Capt Fernando’s recommendation and the submission of the recommendation in Par. 5. Lt Sonders refused to sign Capt Fernando’s report.
d. In addition, it is interesting to note that Luansing and 95 of his men were recognized. Any actual attachment may have involved these members and no others, because the attachment papers apply to Luansing and his unit and he claims that his unit has not been recognized.
e. For record of actual services, as alleged, reference is directed to report of investigation by Capt Fernando and to unit file attached thereto as inclosures.
4. POLITICAL ASPECTS: This unit does not appear to have any political affiliations or aspirations.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the Luansing Unit, Fil-American Batangas Guerrillas be not favorably considered for recognition.