Letter from Captain Curfman Suggesting Fraudulent Luansing Unit Document
The Luansing Unit Fil-American Batangas Guerrillas were commanded by one Galicano Luansing and known loosely as the “Luansing’s Unit.” This guerrilla outfit was at one time or the other during the Japanese occupation affiliated with the Fil-American Irregular Troops and also the President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas. By the time the Allied forces return to the Philippines, it was operating independently. This unit assisted the United States Army in campaigns against the Japanese forces from Balayan, Batangas Town, Lipa, Rosario and San Juan. In this document1 is contained testimony that a document submitted by the Luansing Unit allegedly from one Coll. Boysie Day was fraudulent. The scan of the original document did not include the signatory, but from the report of Lt. Bruce Bromley Jr, we know that this was written and signed by one Captain J. L. Curfman.
S i r :
The attached letter, on Bushmaster stationery, appears to be false.
I am well acquainted with Boysie E. Day and neither the wording, writing or the signature appears to me that of Boise E. Day. Furthermore, I am almost positive Major Day was promoted to Lt. Col. before 27 March 1945, date subject letter was written. I am sure he was a Lt. Col. when we invaded Legaspi, 1 April 1945.
During the month of March 1945, I spent much time assisting our Bn, S-4 in getting supplies to the troops. This duty put me in contact with all the 2nd Bn regularly and I do not remember of ever seeing more than one company of Guerrillas all told. About 40 or 50 of these were strung out along the road to protect our kitchen crews who brought up our hot meal each day and there was approximately a platoon of 30 or 40 with each of our 3 rifle companies. We had 15 attached to our Bn. S-2 section for patrolling purposes, 3 or 4 of which were killed one day while on patrol.
We always kept our guerrilla forces to a minimum because of the chow situation. It took 3 to 4 times as many rations for the guerrillas as it did for the GI’s.
Therefore, I am sure our guerrilla strength, on the Batangas operation, was less than 150 at all times.
[Note to reader: document scan was incomplete and ended at the above paragraph.]