Action Report of the Destroyer Squadron Five on the Nasugbu Landing, Jan 1945

PART I

Brief Summary

PART III

Chronological Account

0630 – Screening vessels less TINSMAN and RICHARD W. SUESENS underway from Tolosa, Leyte and joined Task Group 78.2 in landing exercises off Tarrangona, Leyte.

1030 – Exercises complete; anchored.

1800 – Task Group underway for objective area. Ships of this unit took stations in anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defense screen in accordance with reference (b). PC 1129, PC 623 and 4 YMS⁶ were stationed additionally in screen. Station assignments were as follows:

Shifted PC 623 to station 4, YMS 10 to station 8.

Shifted SUESENS to station 2 and TINSMAN to station 3 to provide better anti-submarine protection. YMS 52 was shifted to station 5. YSM 340 and YSM 368 were taken out of screen and joined main body; stations 10 and 11 abandoned.

1900 – Shifted PC 1129 to station 5. YMS 10 detached to return Mindoro. YMS 52 joined main group. CONYGHAM and SHAW took stations 11 and 10 respectively; stations 8, 9, 12, and 13 now empty.

2200 – RUSSELL proceeded ahead with mine sweeping unit to act as navigational guide and mine destruction ship.

0625 – TINSMAN detached to rendezvous with Task Unit 77.2.2 (DENVER, FLETCHER, O’BANNON).

0715 – Fire Support ships commenced bombardment in accordance with AnnexC of reference (b). Schedule of fires was strictly adhered to. No return fire was encountered.

0812 – All fire support ships ceased firing.

0818 – Fire assault wave landed.

TINSMAN returned to outer screening station.

CLAXTON delivered counter better fire against machine gun nest at Wawa.

1600 – SAUFLEY reported for duty and was stationed in outer screen.

1648 – RUSSEL detached and departed.

1830 – CTG 78.2 in SPENCER with SHAW, CONYNGHAM and SAUFLEY retired from beachhead area for night.

1900 – Stationed screeing vessels as follows:

1909 – Bright moonlight (3/4 moon), sea smooth, light variable winds.

2257 – LOUGH reported numerous small boats in her vicinity.

2266 – PC 1129 reported several small boats close aboard (this was the only and last communication from PC 1129) and was told be alert for enemy “Q” boats.

2309 – LOUGH identified boats as enemy suicide craft and commenced firing. At about this time, unknown to this Command, PC 1129 was sunk.

2300-2400 – TINSMAN, CLAXTON and FLUSSER were directed to close and engage. LOUGH reported 25 to 30 “Q” boats in area.

0000 – Action continuing with illumination and gunfire against targets of opportunity.

0023 – CLAXTON reported torpedo wake close aboard to starboard.

0030 – (about) All contacts lost, attack successfully repelled. LOUGH was directed to pick up survivors of PC 1129, screened by CLAXTON.

0105 – LOUGH completed picking up survivors, having recovered 7 officers and 56 enlisted men, of whom 14 were wounded (only one man was missing). LOUGH proceeded to beach to transfer wounded.

0100-0230 – TINSMAN, CLAXTON and FLUSSER swept and searched area, no further encounters with “Q” boats, no survivors (friend or enemy) found.

0230 – Ships resumed former screen stations.

0508 – LOUGH opened fire on single large enemy boat.

0513 – FLUSSER provided star shell illumination for LOUGH’s contact.

0515 – LOUGH reported boat sunk.

0538 – No further contacts, search discontinued, reformed screen.

0755 – FLUSSER discovered and shot Japanese survivor after he steadfastly refused to be picked up.

0800 – SAUFLEY (returning with CTG 78.2) engaged and sank one enemy “Q” boat.

0830 – CTG 78.2 in SPENCER, with SHAW, CONYNGHAM, and SAUFLEY returned to anchorage area. SHAW was stationed as radar picket and fighter director ship west of Fortune Island as before. CONYNGHAM and CLAXTON were stationed in outer screen.

1039-1100 – SAUFLEY engaged in call fire mission in vicinity of San Diego Point.

1145-1346 – CONYNGHAM and CLAXTON supported three LCI(G)⁸ on “Q” boat hunt in coves around Talin Point.

1900 – Formed screen along arc as on 31 January with ships in following order from north to south: PC 623, RICHARD W. SUESENS, CLAXTON, TINSMAN, CONYNGHAM, LOUGH. SHAW remained in picket station. FLUSSER and SAUFLEY stationed inside screen as support. SPENCER inside screen.

2250 – LOUGH reported surface contact and proceeded to investigate.

2250 – LOUGH reported visual contact with two large boats. CONYNGHAM was directed to support LOUGH.

2258-2348 – The two boats were taken under fire by LOUGH and CONYNGHAM, resulting in their destruction. Details are contained in enclosures (C) and (H).

2308 – LOUGH reported flotilla of small boats approaching (later identified as reefs). TINSMAN and CLAXTON were directed to close for further support. SHAW joined screen.

2330 – LOUGH reported small boats close inshore.

2332 – FLUSSER illuminated coastline between San Diego Point and Talin Point with star shells, results negative.

2400 – Screening ships resumed stations.

0110 – LST’s⁹ departed from beach area. Formed disposition for departure from Nasugbu area.

0240 – CTG 78.2 in SPENCER with LOUGH proceeded ahead, placing this Command as C.T.G. Group then consisted of 8 LST’s, 20 LCI(G), (M) and (R), U.S.S. GRASP, screened by FLUSSER, SHAW, CONYNGHAM, SAUFLEY, CLAXTON, RICHARD W. SUESENS, TINSMAN and PC 623. Set course for Mangarin Bay, Mindoro, at 10.5 knots.

1450 – TINSMAN detached, proceeding ahead.

PART IV

Ordnance

PART V

Damage

PART VI

Special Comments

The approach of the Japanese “Q” boats was most difficult to detect. They were not picked up by any radars. They could be sighted with binoculars in bright moonlight at a range of about one thousand yards. When making speed, only the bow wave could be seen on first sighting, giving the appearance of a ski-board. At about five hundred yards, this bow wave could be seen with the naked eye.

It is estimated that the speed of these “Q” boats was between 10 and 15 knots. Their tactics seemed to be approach in column and then separate and surround a ship in groups of four to six. It is believed that their armament was principally depth charges which required them to approach practically alongside their victim. No machine gun fire from these boats was experienced. At least one torpedo seems to have been fired, and it is considered probable that a few torpedo launching craft or midget submarines accompanied the others. One “Q” boat was seen to jettison a depth charge, which exploded in his wake, and then retire to the shore line. There were several unexplained underwater explosions.

No main battery gunfire was directed at the “Q” boats because they could not be picked up and held by the director while the ships were maneuvering. The automatic weapon pointers were blinded by the tracers and lost sight of the targets after the first shot, however at very close ranges these weapons accounted for all boats that were sunk. Fifty caliber machine guns should be quite effective. Star shell illumination was useful for detection but did not prove to be of much assistance to the gun pointers. Searchlight illumination was not effective and is not recommended with multiple targets. Small arms were distributed about the ships and these should prove invaluable in some cases.

The tactics used against “Q” boats in this instance (where the problem was to deny them passage to an anchorage) provided a defense in depth with mutual support, and at the same time avoided too close a concentration with mutual interference. If only “Q” boats are present the best individual tactics are to employ moderate speed and modest maneuvering in order to avoid running them down and to prevent too many closing at once. However, if torpedo launching boats are also present, as is suspected in this case, it becomes necessary to maneuver constantly and requires extra vigilance by lookouts and extra skill by automatic weapon gunners.

Although there is a natural desire to destroy these boats at safe distances, it was found the “kills” could not be expected beyond ranges of about 100 yards, and some were destroyed as close as 25 yards. Therefore it is necessary to close them (or permit them to