Fernando Air Base and the 1989 Coup Attempt vs Cory Aquino’s Government

Although Corazon Aquino was swept to power by the hugely popular “People Power Revolution” in 1986, her presidency – which lasted until 1992 – was not without dissent, especially from certain sectors within the armed forces. These sectors ultimately boiled down to two: supporters of the deposed former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and – ironically because they were instrumental in the ascension of Aquino to the Presidency – the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM)¹.

As early as 1986, there were already plots to overthrow Aquino’s government from within the armed forces, subsequently discovered and eventually quashed. There were six such plots in total from 1986 to 1987. Of these, however, only one was ever put into action, the August 1987 coup which left a total of 53 people dead².

The most serious threat to Aquino’s government was executed by the RAM in what history remembers as the “Christmas Coup,” staged beginning 1 December 1989 and ended on the 9^th of the same month. Rebellious soldiers led by Colonel Gregorio Honasan, General Edgardo Abenina and retired General Jose Ma. Zumel managed to take hold of Fort Bonifacio, parts of Camp Aguinaldo and Philippine Air Force (PAF) bases at Villamor, Sangley Point and Mactan in Cebu³.

It was from these bases that planes were launched with orders to attack Malacañang Palace. Although forces loyal to the Aquino administration quickly fought back to regain control, the crisis escalated to such an extent that Aquino herself had to seek “United States military assistance at the behest of her military commanders⁴.”

While action was fought mostly in Metro Manila, because the coup attempt was essentially divisive among soldiers, the situation was naturally tense elsewhere in the country but particularly so in places where there were military installations. For the city of Lipa in the Province of Batangas, because Air Force facilities in Villamor, Sangley and Mactan were already in rebel soldiers’ hands, things were decidedly awkward inside Fernando Air Base (FAB).

As early as the 30^th of November, then PAF Commanding General Jose de Leon, acting on intelligence reports regarding the sabotage of an Air Force repeater station located in Tagaytay City⁵, declared red alert⁶ in all PAF units around the Philippines. These included, of course, FAB. Intelligence reports were also beginning to circulate in military circles about a coup being staged at dawn the following day, the 1^st of December. Colonel Felipe Abaño Jr., Commander of the 100^th Training Wing inside FAB, “ordered that base security be increased⁷.”

This move was particularly prudent in view of the fact that early in the morning of the following day, Marines from nearby Fort Bonifacio had smashed their way through the gates of Villamor Air Base and gained control within an hour⁸.

At FAB, Abaño faced a tricky situation because Colonel Hector Tarrazona, Director for Operations of the 100^th Training Wing, had called him up after momentarily stepping out of a meeting with some junior pilots to bring to his attention that some of these pilots had “wanted to fly SF-260 aircraft⁹ and conduct persuasion flights¹⁰ over Manila in support of the coup¹¹.

This meeting was held at 8:30 in the morning of 1 December. Apart from Tarrazona, present in the meeting were 26 junior pilots, the Wing Chaplain, the Medical Officer, the Legal Officer, members of the Wing Staff and other junior officers. Abaño “instructed Colonel Tarranza to dissuade the officers from carrying out their plan and, instead, follow the chain of command¹².

While Tarrazona and the pilots were meeting, Abaño had ordered the maintenance officer of the 443^rd Field Depot and Maintenance Squadron “to place all the aircraft inside the hangar and remove from the planes all batteries and parts needed to make them operational, keep the planes in a secured place and otherwise prevent the planes at all costs from flying¹³.”

Fortuitously, after an hour and a half of candid discussions during which five of the junior officers, it was noted, were vocally sympathetic to the coup plotters, the group decided to remain loyal to the government. Tarranza had promised all confidentiality, and while only five of the junior officers were vocal, he also noted that “if we go by head count, most of the pilots were sympathetic to [the] rebels.” After deciding to stay on the side of the government, the same five vocal officers “assisted in the strengthening of the defenses of the base¹⁴.”